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Abstract
I examine the effect of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010
(ACA) on food hardship in US households, utilizing food security information from the
Food Security Supplement of the Current Population Survey. Because states adopted
the Medicaid expansions provided under the ACA at different times beginning in 2014,
the cross-state, over time variation allows me to separate the impact of the ACA on
food hardship using triple difference specifications. The richness of questions in the
Food Security Supplement allows me to examine the effect of the ACA across differ-
ent measures of food hardship, and also examine differential response for households
participating in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Examining
the mechanisms through which the ACA could affect food insecurity, I find the ACA
not only increased average weekly food expenditure, but also the probability a house-
hold participates in SNAP. I employ a two-stage, control function approach to address
reverse causality between SNAP and food insecurity. I find that the ACA reduced
the probability that a household participating in SNAP falls into the two lowest food
security categories by 6.5 percentage points and reduced the probability of being food
insecure by 14.2 percentage points. Across specifications, I find strong evidence for
increasing returns to program participation, and evidence of a differential impact of
the ACA across the distribution of food hardship.
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I. Introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 enacted broad reform for
healthcare in the United States. The number of Americans lacking health insurance has been
a public health issue for policy makers, with 17.5% of non-elderly individuals uninsured in
2009. The ACA implemented large expansions in Medicaid that provided subsidized health
insurance coverage for individuals less than 133% of the federal poverty line. However, 19
states chose not to expand Medicaid, leaving residents who did not qualify for Medicaid
under previous rules ineligible for increased benefits provided by the ACA.
Alongside the lack of health insurance, food insecurity has emerged as a persistent public
health concern facing the nation. From 2008 through 2016, between 12% and 15% of house-
holds were food insecure. While food insecurity has been declining in recent years, in 2016
12.3% percent of US households were still defined as food insecure by the U.S. Department
of Agriculture, implying 15.6 million households did not have adequate access to the quan-
tity nor quality of food necessary for a healthy lifestyle. Moreover, 6.1 million households
experienced very low food security, a severe category of food insecurity that often results in
families not eating for entire days (Coleman-Jensen et al., 2017).
The health consequences of food insecurity can be dire. Food insecurity has detrimental
effects on adult health, and is associated with poor nutritional outcomes, both obesity and
low body mass index, less healthy diets, poor mental health outcomes, and various other
serious conditions (Cook et al., 2013; Heflin and Ziliak, 2008; Bhattacharya et al., 2004).
Children living in food insecure households have also been shown to be negatively affected
by food insecurity, being more likely to have poor health (Gundersen et al., 2011; Meyerhoefer
and Yang, 2011; Almond et al., 2011; Gundersen and Kreider, 2009; Cook et al., 2004), have
poor BMI (Gundersen and Kreider, 2009), experience behavioral issues (Howard, 2011), and
experience a host of specific health problems (Chi et al., 2014; Gundersen and Ziliak, 2014).
Gundersen and Ziliak (2015) show that these poor outcomes are evident across studies,
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countries, data sets, and time periods.
Policy makers have many traditional methods of combating food insecurity such as the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), one of the largest public assistance
programs in the US (5th by expenditure, 3rd by recipients), the Special Supplemental Nu-
trition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), and school breakfast and lunch
programs. As noted by Moffitt (2015), nearly 80% of SNAP recipients also receive Medicaid
benefits, however, we know little about how healthcare policy, acting alone or in concert
with other food programs, may affect food insecurity. Despite the proliferation of literature
on both food insecurity and the ACA, few studies, if any, have yet examined potential links
between public healthcare and food insecurity. Public healthcare provides in-kind benefits
to at-risk individuals, and while these benefits do not directly address food insecurity, they
may free up household income to be redirected toward alleviating food hardship.
I fill this gap in the literature using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS)
Food Security Supplement for years 2001-2016 to present the first evidence on the effect
of the ACA on food insecurity in America. I contribute to the literature examining the
effect of non-food programs on food insecurity, and I extend these studies by analyzing
the interaction between the traditional food support system (SNAP) and Medicaid. For my
purposes, I limit the impact of the ACA to families with incomes less than 185% of the federal
poverty line, capturing not only the population most served by Medicaid expansion, but also
households who are likely to receive food benefits. I utilize variation across time in the
roll-out of Medicaid expansion through the ACA, as well as cross-state variation in Medicaid
expansion, to identify the effect of the ACA. This allows me to employ a quasi-experimental
design, examining the impact of the ACA across many food insecurity thresholds and varying
definitions of food hardship. As many studies have shown (Gregory et al., 2015; Gundersen
et al., 2011), reverse causality between SNAP and food insecurity results in the endogeneity of
SNAP benefits. Thus, I use a two stage control function approach to address the endogeneity
of SNAP and its interaction with Medicaid expansions. I find that the ACA had the largest
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impact for households already participating in SNAP, reducing the probability that these
households fall into the two lowest categories of food security by 6.5 percentage points. I also
find the ACA reduced the probability households participating in SNAP are food insecure by
14.2 percentage points. I find the ACA increased average household weekly food expenditure,
as well as the probability the household participates in SNAP, providing two avenues through
which the ACA could influence food hardship.
These results suggest that while the safety net does affect food insecurity, it does not
do so uniformly across the distribution of food hardship. I show that the largest mitigating
factor for those experiencing very low, low, or marginal food security is SNAP. However,
spillovers from the ACA increase gains in food security by roughly 50% at all thresholds,
with larger total gains at the low end of the food security spectrum. I show large, increasing
returns to program participation, of particular importance for policy makers and researchers
studying safety net programs. By ignoring the positive spillovers from the ACA and SNAP,
we risk drastically understating the efficacy of both programs in addressing food insecurity.
II. Background and Motivation
Official food insecurity statistics are reported by the United States Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA) and come from the Food Security Supplement (FSS) in the December Current
Population Survey (CPS). Coleman-Jensen et al. (2017) categorize food security as all in-
dividuals in a household having enough food for an active, healthy lifestyle. Households
are placed into categories of food hardship based on their responses to 18 questions in the
FSS, with affirmative responses indicating increased food hardship for the family. The mod-
ule includes three questions about food conditions of the entire household, seven questions
about food security conditions of adults in the household, and eight questions about food
conditions of children if they are present.
I use the nomenclature of the USDA and consider four categories of food security—fully
food secure, marginally food secure, low food secure, and very low food secure. Households
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are fully food secure if they report no food insecure conditions, marginally food secure if they
report one or two food insecure conditions, low food secure if they report three to five food
insecure conditions with no children (three to seven with children), and very low food secure
if they report six or more food insecure conditions (8 or more with children). For some of my
analyses, I instead focus on the nonmutually exclusive categories of marginally food insecure,
food insecure, and very low food secure. Households are marginally food insecure if they
report at least one food insecure condition, food insecure if they report at least three food
insecure conditions, and are very low food secure if they report six or more food insecure
conditions (eight or more if children are present in the household). Note that all households
that are very low food secure will also be food insecure and marginally food insecure, and
all households that are food insecure will also be marginally food insecure.
The questions that characterize food hardship are summarized in table 1. Examples of
questions include “We worried whether our food would run out before we got money to
buy more.” (the least severe); “In the last 12 months, did you lose weight because there
wasn’t enough money for food?”; or the most severe, “In the last 12 months did any of the
children ever not eat for a whole day because there wasn’t enough money for food?” These
questions are designed to assess a spectrum of food hardship ranging from stress about the
adequacy of food, to monetary concerns associated with food costs, to the lack of meals for
members of the family. Each of these questions is also qualified by the stipulation that the
food insecure condition be a result of lack of funds, rather than some other reason for the
reported hardship. The questions are designed to assess the impact of household financial
conditions on the general adequacy of food.
Figure 1 shows response rates to these questions over time. What is immediately apparent
is that response rates to questions indicating food hardship for adults are much higher than
those indicating food hardship among children. The first panel of figure 1 demonstrates that
many households worried about their ability to maintain adequate food in the household
(questions 1-3). From 2008 onward, between 16-20 percent of households worried they would
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run out of money for food, while roughly 15% of households ran out of money for food or
could not afford to eat balanced meals. A smaller portion of households had to reduce their
food intake due to lack of sufficient funds for food (questions 4-10).
The second panel of figure 1 shows that less than 1% of households with children were
forced to reduce food intake for children (questions 14-18). However, children were not
completely insulated from food hardship, with around 4-6% of households with children
forced to reduce the quality of meals for children, and 3-4% of households with children
unable to feed the children balanced meals. Taken together, these questions show that many
households experience many different kinds of food hardship.
The reforms of the ACA were not designed to directly address food hardship, rather,
they focused on decreasing the population of uninsured individuals through the expansion
of Medicaid to those below 133% of the federal poverty line (FPL), decreasing the cost of
healthcare through additional subsidies, and improving the continuity and quality of care
received through new regulations. Health insurance exchanges were established in order to
provide a statewide marketplace where consumers could compare competing health plans.
Individual mandates required that all individuals obtain a minimum standard of health
insurance, and employer mandates required employers with more than 50 employees offer
insurance coverage that meets minimum requirements. New regulations were put into place
that addressed the price and types of services insurance plans covered, as well as changing
how insurance companies delivered and charged for care.
States that expanded Medicaid coverage received additional subsidies from the federal
government for doing so, and also had more control over the operation of the state-run
health exchanges. Prior to the ACA, the income limit for Medicaid eligibility was 100% FPL.
The ACA mandated that those less than 133% FPL1 be eligible for Medicaid, expanding
the population of potential beneficiaries. However, the Supreme Court ruled in National
1The law also proposes a 5% income disregard, making the effective income eligibility limit 138% FPL.
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services classify the limit as 133% FPL, which I will follow in this
paper.
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Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius in 2012 that mandated Medicaid expansions
were unconstitutional, and allowed states to opt out of the expansions. Twenty four states
and the District of Columbia enacted Medicaid expansion on January 1, 2014. Subsequently,
7 states expanded Medicaid in later years.2 Figure 2 shows the cross-state and over time
variation in Medicaid expansion. Many states on the East and West Coast, as well as
Midwestern states, chose to expand Medicaid, while many Southern states did not. However,
some Southern states like Kentucky, West Virginia, Arkansas, and Louisiana did choose to
expand Medicaid, while some coastal states, like Maine, chose not to, showing the expansion
decision was not exclusively regional. These reforms all attempt to reduce the burden of
healthcare costs by moderating the price of healthcare and increasing healthcare coverage.
Evidence suggests that the ACA has increased coverage, and benefited individuals who
were targeted by the ACA. Black and Cohen (2015) find that not only has the number of
uninsured decreased after the implementation of the ACA, but also states that expanded
Medicaid saw larger decreases in the uninsured population. Courtemanche et al. (2017) also
find that the ACA increased coverage, and note that coverage increased through both public
and private markets. Some evidence suggests that the expansion of Medicaid may have
crowded out private insurance (Wagner, 2015). Still, the broad impact seems to be that the
ACA increased coverage across the population, not only amongst low-income individuals,
with overall improvements in health and access (Antwi et al., 2015; Sommers et al., 2012).
Hu et al. (2016) have shown the ACA contributed to the financial security of individuals
in Medicaid expansion states, decreasing levels of debt and enabling individuals to meet
other financial obligations. With evidence suggesting small (if any) negative impacts on
employment (Garrett and Kaestner, 2014), and overall decreases in the amount of resources
individuals need to devote to healthcare, the ACA could have a potentially large impact on
food insecurity by changing the consumer’s budget set.
2Michigan (4/1/2014), New Hampshire (8/15/2014), Pennsylvania (1/1/2015), Indiana (2/1/2015),
Alaska (9/1/2015), Montana (1/1/2016), and Louisiana (7/1/2016). The election of Matt Bevin as gov-
ernor of Kentucky has prompted the state to discuss dismantling the Medicaid expansion in place.
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Figure 3 shows average food insecurity across states in 2012-2013 and 2014-2015, imme-
diately before and after the ACA Medicaid expansions. In 2013, no states had expanded
Medicaid, while by 2015, all but two states that ultimately expanded Medicaid had done
so. After expanding Medicaid, four states worsened with regard to food insecurity (Alaska,
Indiana, New Jersey, and New Mexico), while many others improved. Many states that did
not expand Medicaid saw improvements in food insecurity; however, states like Alabama,
Nebraska, Maine, and South Carolina saw increases in food insecurity, while others such as
Louisiana (which did not expand Medicaid until 2016), Mississippi, and Georgia, saw no
change in food insecurity, leaving many residents without access to sufficient food. While
the maps are far from definitive regarding the relationship between public healthcare and
food insecurity, they do provide some context for further analysis of how healthcare subsidies
may affect food insecurity.
Figures 5-7 present a simple budget constraint analysis to provide intuition about the
effect of Medicaid subsidies on food consumption, and how participation in SNAP may affect
these outcomes. I assume convex preferences that can be well represented by a generic utility
curve. Figure 5 shows how consumption of both food and all other goods (which includes
medical care) responds to Medicaid benefits. In the absence of subsidized medical care,
a representative consumer would consume some mix of both food and other goods, here
represented by (F0,G0). The introduction of public health insurance guarantees some base
level of medical care, creating a kink in the budget set represented by point D. This causes
an outward shift in the budget set, resulting in an increase in consumption of both food and
other goods. Figure 6 shows the analogous shift in the budget set from the introduction of
SNAP benefits. Once again, we see that the SNAP subsidy increases consumption of both
food and other goods.
Figure 7 depicts an individual receiving both Medicaid and SNAP subsidies. In the
depicted scenario, consumption of both food and other goods increase from (F0,G0) to
(F3,G3). These three figures show how the introduction of Medicaid benefits may increase
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consumption of food, thereby reducing food insecurity. However, I also show that the increase
in consumption may not be the same for all Medicaid beneficiaries. If an individual does
not receive SNAP benefits, they consume the bundle (F1,G1) after the expansion of benefits.
Individuals participating in SNAP consume (F3,G3), which is not necessarily, or likely, equal
to (F1,G1).
In each of these scenarios, it may be possible that the subsidies do not increase the
consumption of either other goods or food. For example, Medicaid or SNAP subsidies may
simply result in an increase in other goods consumed, with no change in food consumption. If
subsidies do not increase food consumption, this suggests that the individual does not desire
additional food, and that the individual in unlikely to be food insecure. This is unlikely to
be the case for SNAP recipients; Hoynes et al. (2015) show that, in the case of SNAP, most
consumers are inframarginal, consuming more than the cash value of benefits, indicating
consumption at any point Fj < F0 (including point E) unlikely after receiving the SNAP
subsidy. Moreover, Beatty and Tuttle (2014) show that increases in SNAP benefits from
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 resulted in more spending than even
typical theory suggests. Medicaid subsidies have been shown to increase the consumption of
medical care (Wherry and Miller, 2016), however, the link between Medicaid and food con-
sumption is not as clear, thus, I will explore whether the ACA has increased the consumption
of food. Finally, it may be the case that the addition of subsidies changes preferences for
food or other goods, resulting in a change in the marginal rate of substitution and the shape
of the indifference curves, which could also result in no increase in food consumption.
The goal of this paper is to disentangle the effect of ACA Medicaid expansion alone
and the effect of ACA Medicaid expansion for individuals also participating in SNAP. This
paper fits into the small literature examining the issues associated with the interaction of
non-food programs and food insecurity, alongside Borjas (2004) who examines the impact
of welfare reform on food insecurity, and Schmidt et al. (2015), who simulate eligibility
for many programs, including Medicaid, to determine the effect of cash benefits on food
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insecurity. Identifying this interaction is difficult. There is a large literature on the effect of
nutrition programs on food insecurity; however, reverse causality between SNAP and food
insecurity can often severely bias estimates. Overall, after controlling for the endogeneity
associated with reverse causality, results suggest that SNAP reduces food insecurity and
improves the health outcomes of recipients (Hoynes et al., 2016; Gregory et al., 2015; Hoynes
and Schanzenbach, 2015; Gundersen and Ziliak, 2014; Yen, 2010). To understand how the
ACA interacts with traditional food programs, I control for the the endogeneity of SNAP.
Similar to Borjas (2004), I employ a two stage control function strategy that accounts for
the endogeneity of all interactions of the ACA and SNAP.
III. Model
Ordered Probit
Most studies that examine food hardship consider only the most widely reported category,
food insecurity. However, it is not immediately apparent that the ACA should have similar
effects across the distribution of food insecure households. Moreover, figure 3 suggests differ-
ential food insecurity rates across states that expanded Medicaid, with some states showing
much larger decreases in food insecurity than others. Thus, I begin by analyzing how the
ACA affected the probability a household falls within the mutually exclusive categories of
marginally food secure, low food secure, and very low food secure. By establishing an or-
dering, I’m able to see how the ACA might move families along the distribution of food
insecurity.
These categories represent increased levels of food hardship, with very low food security
being more severe than low food security, both of which are more severe than being marginally
food secure. I employ an ordered probit model that uses these categories as thresholds. My
primary specification is
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Food Rank∗ijt = β1ACAjt + β2SNAPijt + β3(ACA × SNAP)ijt
+X ′ijtβ4 + δt + δj + ηijt (1)
where, Food Rank∗ijt is a latent variable representing where a household falls on the food secu-
rity spectrum. As Food Rank∗ijt crosses some unknown thresholds αl, food hardship increases
such that for Food Rank∗ijt < α0 the household is fully food secure, α0 < Food Rank∗ijt ≤ α1
the household is marginally food secure, and so on. I let Food Rank∗ijt ∈ {0,1,2,3}, and
define Food Rank∗ijt below.
Food Rank∗ijt =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if Fully Food Secure
1 if Marginally Food Secure
2 if Low Food Secure
3 if Very Low Food Secure
(2)
Thus, Food Rank∗ijt describes household i’s food security status in state j at time t, δj, δt
are state and year fixed effects, and Xijt is a vector of state and household demographic
characteristics shown to impact food insecurity, including gender, household size, number
of children, marital status, age, age squared, disability status, race, education, urban/rural
status, number of Medicaid beneficiaries in the state, governor party affiliation, the natural
log of the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile of income, and the unemployment rate
(Ziliak, 2015; Gundersen and Ribar, 2011; Bartfeld and Dunifon, 2006; Bhattacharya et al.,
2004).
Since implementation of the ACA took place at different times across different states, I
estimate a continuous measure of the proportion of the year a state had Medicaid reform
implemented (ACAjt). This variable holds at zero for states such as South Carolina which
never implement Medicaid reform, is a 1 for 2014 onward for states such as Kentucky who
implement Medicaid reform at the beginning of 2014, and is some positive fraction for the
remaining states. To more accurately capture the treatment population, I limit the impact
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of the ACA to only those less than 185% of the federal poverty line (FPL). While the ACA
extends coverage to those less than 133% of the FPL, special SNAP eligibility requirements
for the elderly and disabled, along with provisions for broad based categorical eligibility, make
this threshold less clear.3 This results in an intention to treat estimate, with identification
coming from cross-state and over time variation of Medicaid expansion, framed as a triple
difference specification.
SNAPijt is a dichotomous measure of SNAP participation, equal to one if the household
participates in SNAP and zero otherwise. Reverse causality between SNAP and food inse-
curity is a significant issue. Bitler (2015) notes that SNAP use is correlated with observable
characteristics regarding health, but also unobserved characteristics such as innate health,
health habits, and general self-care that researchers may not observe in the data. Prima facie
evidence often seems to suggest that SNAP actually increases food insecurity, a result of
significantly biased estimates. It is highly unlikely that there is some underlying propensity
for food insecurity amongst SNAP recipients, rather, it is more likely that those with strong
needs seek food assistance. There have been a variety of approaches to control for this reverse
causality (Gregory et al., 2015; Schmeiser, 2012; Gundersen et al., 2011; Meyerhoefer and
Yang, 2011; Yen, 2010; Borjas, 2004). Any method employing matching estimators relies
crucially on matching on only observed characteristics, which does not address unobserved
health conditions. Moreover, the health stock evolves dynamically. This presents challenges
in panel settings when trying to account for unobserved selection via a fixed effects approach,
which will be insufficient for addressing time variant unobserved heterogeneity.
To address the endogeneity of SNAP as a result of this reverse causality, I use measures
of SNAP access and state level measures of benefit generosity to exogenously identify SNAP
participation, employing a control function approach. I use measures of broad based cate-
gorical eligibility, fingerprinting requirements, the presence of online applications (and the
ability to sign these applications online), the presence of vehicle exclusions, non-citizen eligi-
3The binned income data of the December CPS also makes identifying the 133% FPL threshold difficult.
185% of the FPL corresponds to the variable hrpoor in the CPS data, and is a more precise threshold.
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bility requirements, the family specific SNAP benefit, and the log of the prevailing minimum
wage as exogenous identifying variation. Ziliak (2015) discusses many of these state level
SNAP eligibility and policy parameters, and how they influence SNAP take-up, while Gre-
gory et al. (2015) and Borjas (2004) use many of these variables (specifically the eligibility
of non-citizens) as key identifying parameters. Letting Zjt be the set of exogenous variables,
the requirements for the validity of this control function strategy are that E[Zjtηijt] = 0 and
E[ZjtSNAPijt] ≠ 0, or that the policy instruments are both orthogonal to individual level
health investment decisions and correlated with participation in SNAP. Since these policy
variables are set at the state level, it is unlikely that they are determined by individual level
health based decisions, lending credence to the exogeneity of the policy variables.
I include the interaction of the ACA and SNAP to examine whether the impact of the
marginal benefit dollar will differentially affect SNAP beneficiaries vs non-participants. In
this model, (ACA × SNAP)ijt will be endogenous through the endogeneity of SNAP. I in-
strument for this interaction with the product of the exogenous variables and the measure
of the ACA. Thus, my first stage regressions take the form
SNAPijt = γ1ACAjt +Z ′jtΘ1 +ACAjtZ ′jtΓ1 +X ′ijtΩ1 + δ1t + δ1j + aijt (3)
ACAjt × SNAPijt = γ2ACAjt +Z ′jtΘ2 +ACAjtZ ′jtΓ2 +X ′ijtΩ2 + δ2t + δ2j + eijt (4)
where all variables are defined as above. As noted by Heckman and Robb Jr (1985);
Wooldridge (2002), and Blundell and Powell (2004), to consistently estimate β1, β2, and
β3 in the second stage, the control function methodology also requires the independence of
Zjt and the first stage error terms, or Zjt ⊥ aijt and Zjt ⊥ eijt. While the conditions for the
consistency of the control function approach are less well established for my model, they are
likely to follow through. I then save the residuals, âijt, êijt, and include them in my second
stage specification. Thus, the final functional form of the ordered probit model is
13
Food Rank∗ijt = β1ACAjt + β2SNAPijt + β3(ACA × SNAP)ijt
+X ′ijtβ4 + âijt + êijt + δt + δj + ηijt
= X̃ψ + ηijt
(5)
where the model is simplified to X̃ψ + ηijt for notational convenience. The functional form
of the ordered probit model implies that the probability a household falls into food security
category l is defined by
Pr[Food Rankijt = l] = Pr[αl−1 < Food Rank∗ijt ≤ αl]
= Φ(αl − X̃ψ) −Φ(αl−1 − X̃ψ)
where Φ() is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The regression pa-
rameters are obtained by maximizing the likelihood for the ordered probit, which involves
maximizing the product of the probabilities associated with each discrete outcome. The
marginal effects for each associated outcome are defined by
∂Pr[Food Rankijt = l]
∂X̃
= [φ(αl−1 − X̃ψ) − φ(αl − X̃ψ)]ψ (6)
where φ() = Φ′().
There may be additional concern about the endogeneity of Medicaid expansion through
the ACA in equation (5), however, this concern should be of second order importance.
First, by controlling for governor party affiliation as well as state and year fixed effects, the
endogeneity must enter through time varying, state specific means that remain un-captured
by the changing political climate as controlled for by gubernatorial party. Next, the large
literature on food insecurity establishes the large biases associated with the endogeneity of
SNAP, requiring that addressing this endogeneity be of primary importance for any estimates
of policy on food insecurity. Since I already instrument ACAjt × SNAPijt with ACAjt ×
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Zjt, β3 is biased only if E[(ACAjt × Zjt)ηijt] ≠ 0, or the interaction of state level SNAP
eligibility parameters and Medicaid expansion must be correlated with both some unobserved
propensity for healthcare expansion and food insecurity. Food insecurity was not the primary
concern of the ACA; the topic is not even mentioned in the text of the bill. For β1 to be
biased, Medicaid expansion must be correlated with some unobserved heterogeneity that
is also correlated with food insecurity. By the arguments above, food insecurity was not
only not a driving force in Medicaid expansion, but any political characteristics that might
affect both expansion and food insecurity would be captured through controls for governor
party affiliation as well as the control function approach taken with food policy. Finally,
the intention-to-treat framework mitigates endogeneity through Medicaid take-up since all
individuals in Medicaid expansion states are given the same “treatment” value, regardless
of actual participation. Thus, bias in β1 and β3 resulting from the endogeneity of Medicaid
expansion is likely to be small.
Linear Probability Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences
While the ordered probit model is useful in determining how a household moves from one
mutually exclusive food security category to another, a large portion of the literature exam-
ines the non-mutually exclusive categories of marginally food insecure, food insecure, and
very low food secure. Thus, I also employ linear probability triple difference (difference-
in-difference-in-differences) models, which have the benefit of relaxing the functional form
assumptions of the ordered probit framework. Similar to the models above, I establish
food insecureijt = τ1ACAjt + τ2SNAPijt + τ3(ACAjt × SNAPijt)
+X ′ijtβ + µt + µj + νijt (7)
where food insecureijt ∈{food marginally food insecure, food insecure, very low food secure}
is an indicator measure of household i’s food insecurity status in state j at time t, µt is a
state fixed effect, µj is a time fixed effect, and all other variables are defined as above.
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The same caveats about the reverse causality between SNAP and food insecurity hold
in this model. Thus, I employ an analogous IV approach as above, instrumenting for both
SNAPijt and ACAjt ×SNAPijt. Triple difference specifications also allow me to examine the
effect of the ACA across the distribution of food insecurity, and allow me to directly interpret
the effect of the ACA on falling in to a given food insecurity category. However, they do not
take into account the inherent ordering of food insecurity outcomes. For example, suppose
the marginal effect of the ACA on marginal food insecurity in a triple difference model is
κ > 0. This tells us that individuals living in states that enacted Medicaid reform are κ
percentage points more likely to be marginally food insecure.
This result could have two possible interpretations. The first is that the ACA actually
increased food hardship, resulting in more families describing at least one food insecure
condition. The other possibility is that the ACA increased the probability a household is
marginally food insecure by reducing more severe food deprivation conditions, but not com-
pletely alleviating food hardship all together. Thus, care must be employed when interpreting
the coefficients in the linear probability models.
Mechanisms
I will consider two separate mechanisms through which the ACA could influence food hard-
ship. The first, as discussed previously, is increased food expenditure. If the ACA allows
households to reallocate food away from medical expenditure, toward food expenditure, then
households may be able to reduce their degree of food hardship. To estimate this mechanism,
I will employ the same instrumental variable strategy as before, with
Food Expend.ijt = ψ1ACAjt + ψ2SNAPijt + ψ3(ACA × SNAP)ijt
+X ′ijtψ4 + ρ1t + ρ1j + ζijt (8)
where Food Expend.ijt is weekly food expenditure, in dollars, for household i in state j at
time t, ρ1t and ρ1j are the year and state fixed effects, and all other variables are defined
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as before. Here, the one exception will be the addition of the bin of household income in
Xijt. Since I am estimating a model of expenditure in (8), failing to control for income could
greatly bias results. This model allows me to directly estimate the change in expenditure
due to both Medicaid expansion in the ACA as well as the receipt of SNAP benefits.
The second mechanism I will consider is the influence of the ACA on SNAP take-up.
Moffitt (2015) notes a large degree of multiple program participation in SNAP and Medicaid.
Furthermore, Keane and Moffitt (1998) show that there are many costs associated with
participating in safety-net programs. The expansions of Medicaid through the ACA may
induce households to pay some of these costs, such as stigma and information costs, thereby
making participation in SNAP less costly. The receipt of SNAP benefits, in turn, could
reduce food hardship. Thus, I will estimate
SNAPijt = ι1ACAjt +X ′ijtι2 + ρ2t + ρ2j + ϑijt (9)
through both a probit and linear probability models, where all variables are defined as
before. Since SNAPijt enters on the left hand side of the equation, I do not have to employ
an instrumental variables strategy, and equation (9) takes the form of a simple difference
in differences model where ACAjt is identified through cross state, over time variation in
Medicaid expansion.
Alternative Measures of Food Hardship
All previously described measures of food insecurity estimate the probability a household
falls into a certain category of food insecurity, but fail to take into account the variability
of food deprivation within a given category, and fail to fully utilize the richness of the 18
question food security supplement. Dutta and Gundersen (2007) propose new measures that
more strongly weight households that experience severe food deprivation. I consider two
measures the authors propose—the food insecurity gap and the square of the food insecurity
gap, which are based on similar measures utilized in the income poverty literature. These
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measures are also utilized in Gundersen (2008).
To compute the food insecurity gap, affirmative answers to the 18 question food secu-
rity supplement are converted into a single indicator by the Rasch scoring method, which
measures the probability a household answers in the affirmative depending on the degree of
food insecurity experienced by the household and the extent of food insecurity captured by
the question. Using this Rasch score, one can create an index that measures how far a food
insecure household is from the food security threshold relative to the maximum distance
from the food security threshold (i.e. answering in the affirmative to all 18 questions in the
food security supplement.) Letting dijt be the normalized distance from the food security
threshold, the normalized food insecurity gap is measured as:
dijt = { sijt−ez−e if si > e
0 if si ≤ e (10)
where sijt is the Rasch scoring indicator, which depends not only on the number of questions
an individual answers affirmatively, but also on family structure. The maxima of the Rasch
scores are represented by z, and are 13.03 for a household with children, and 11.05 for a
household without children. e is the minimum value for a household to be food insecure, and
is 3.10 for a household with children, and 2.56 for a household without children. Thus, all
food secure households obtain a value of zero, and all food insecure households obtain a value
between zero and one based on the severity of their food insecurity. The food insecurity gap
squared is simply d2ijt.
Since the food insecurity gap measure is directly dependent on the number of children,
including IVs that are dependent on the number of children (EITC rates and the family
specific SNAP benefit), along with the number of children directly, violates exclusion restric-
tions. Thus, when modeling the food insecurity gap, I do not include the number of children
in the household as an independent variable. The regression framework takes the form
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dijt = pi1ACAjt + pi2SNAPijt + pi3(ACA × SNAP)ijt
+X ′ijtpi4 + ω1t + ω1j + εijt (11)
where ω1t, ω1j are year and state fixed effects, εijt is the error term, and all other variables
are defined as above. I also address the endogeneity of SNAP in the same manner as before.
The final measure of food deprivation that I consider is the additional amount of money
a household would need to spend each week to purchase enough food to meet household
needs, which I term the income gap. This measure directly monetizes the severity of food
deprivation, providing a continuous scale of income to needs. However, this is also a sub-
jective measure, requiring both accurate assessment and reporting of the money needed to
meet food needs. I model the income gap as
Iijt = λ1ACAjt + λ2SNAPijt + λ3(ACA × SNAP)ijt
+X ′ijtλ4 + ω2t + ω2j + ξijt (12)
where ξijt is the error term, and the definition of variables and the description of the endo-
geneity of SNAP are defined as before.
IV. Data
Individual characteristics, along with food security information, come from the 2001-2016
waves of the Current Population Survey Food Security Supplement, also known as the De-
cember CPS. The December CPS asks all 18 questions in the food security module, which
determines the household’s food security status, with households placed into varying cate-
gories of food hardship depending on the number of affirmative responses to the question-
naire. These categories are defined above, and represent a spectrum of food hardship, with
marginal food security being the least severe, and having very low food security being the
most severe.
Figure 8 depicts rates of food security statistics over time, including marginal food se-
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curity, low food security, and very low food security. In 2007, coinciding with the Great
Recession, we see a large uptick in all categories of food hardship. All categories of food
hardship remain persistently high until approximately 2013, with around 8.5% of households
experiencing marginal food security, 8.5% of households experiencing low food security, and
5% of households experiencing very low food security. These rates begin to trend downward
after 2013, coinciding with the implementation of the ACA. Figure 12 in the appendix de-
tails the commonly reported, nonmutually exclusive categories of food insecurity over time,
showing similar patterns as figure 8.
Figure 9 shows rates of food security by Medicaid expansion status. One of the require-
ments for a difference in differences methodology is the parallel trend assumption for both
treatment and comparison groups. Figure 9 shows generally uniform trends for both Medi-
caid expansion and non-expansion states, validating the assumption of parallel trends. While
it seems that food hardship is generally higher in non-expansion states, there does seem to
be some divergence, especially in low and very low food security, between the groups in later
years.
The December CPS reports the household’s Rasch score, which I use to construct the food
insecurity gap (and squared gap) as defined in equation (11). The mean of the food insecurity
gap (squared food insecurity gap) is 0.13 (0.98) for the population as a whole. Figure 10
depicts the mean of the food insecurity gap for different subsets of households. We see
that poorer households have larger gaps, and that households receiving SNAP benefits and
households headed by single mothers have larger gaps than average. Interestingly, households
in Medicaid expansion states have slightly lower gaps than the national average.
The December CPS also asks questions about average weekly food expenditure, and about
how much more income a household would need to spend each week to purchase enough food
to meet household needs, which I term the income gap. Prior to 2011, average weekly food
expenditure was top-coded at $1,000, while from 2011 onward, the top values range from
$400-530. To account for such a large discrepancy, I use only the years from 2011 onward
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for average weekly expenditure. While this limits the scope of the analysis, the time frame
accounts for a sizable “pre” period prior to ACA Medicaid expansions, as well as the years
post expansion. The income gap changes top-coding more frequently than average weekly
food expenditure, however, I top-code the entire series at $200 for consistency. In each year,
the dollar amounts range from $1 to the top value. The mean of the income gap is $3.99 per
week for the population as a whole. Figure 11 breaks out the income gap by sub-category.
Here, we see SNAP recipients have large income gaps, around $17 per week, with poorer
households and single mothers also experiencing larger income gaps.
Table 2 presents weighted summary statistics from the December CPS by Medicaid ex-
pansion status as well as SNAP receipt. Medicaid expansion states are similar to states that
did not expand Medicaid with regard to poverty, age, education, and household composition.
Individuals in Medicaid expansion states are more likely to be black, live in a metro area,
and experience higher unemployment rates. They also have higher 50/10 income ratios and
the 25th percentile of earnings is higher, suggesting that middle-income inequality is greater
in Medicaid expansion states. Individuals receiving SNAP are more likely to be black or
Hispanic, female, and unmarried. SNAP recipients are also younger, have more children,
and have lower levels of education on average.
To address endogeneity in equation (7), I identify SNAP participation with measures
of SNAP access and generosity from the USDA Economic Research Service SNAP policy
database, along with other state level measures of benefit generosity. The SNAP policy
database documents state policy options for SNAP, and provides these data at a monthly
level. While the majority of the data are up to date, the most recent version of the SNAP
policy database contains missing data for some variables for 2013-2016. I assume missing
values take on the value in the previous year, and if the policy was in effect for a portion of
the year, that fraction is represented in the policy variable. Means for these instruments are
presented in table 3. Data from the University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research are
used for state level economic data, and data on SNAP benefits. SNAP benefits are calculated
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at the national level and adjusted for family size and income, resulting in family size specific
SNAP benefits. I use weighted estimates from the Current Population Survey Annual Social
and Economic Supplement (CPS ASEC) to construct the 50/10 income ratio and the 25th
percentile of income for each state and year.
V. Results
I begin by presenting the ordered probit results examining the mutually exclusive categories
of food security, using a two stage control function approach to control for the endogeneity
of SNAP. I then present linear probability specifications for the nonmutually exclusive food
insecurity categories while instrumenting for the endogeneity of SNAP. Next, I present evi-
dence for the mechanisms through which the ACA might influence food hardship, including
both expenditure and SNAP take-up. Finally, I present other measures of food hardship to
assess the robustness of the impact of the ACA on food insecurity. All models control for
state and year fixed effects, individual characteristics, and all standard errors are clustered
at the state level.
Main Results
Table 4 presents first stage results from the two stage ordered probit model. Not all of the
exogenous, state level policy variables are statistically significant individually, but the policy
variables are strongly jointly significant, with large F statistics and p-values for F statistics
of 0. Moreover, these policy variables have been shown to be predictive in other contexts, as
noted in Ziliak (2015).4 This suggests the policy variables have predictive power for SNAP
receipt.
Table 5 presents the ordered probit results from estimating equation (5), employing a
4While these state level policy variables have been used extensively in other contexts, I am also able to
examine them one by one for the validity of their inclusion in the instrument set. For example, the p-values
for the C-statistic for the natural log of the minimum wage are above 0.05 for all triple difference models
except those marginal food insecurity, suggesting it’s inclusion in the set of exogenous policy variables is
valid.
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control function approach. I present coefficients, as well as marginal effects (at means) for
the three mutually exclusive categories of households experiencing food hardship. Using
an ordered probit framework allows me to examine how both SNAP and the ACA move
households from more severe food insecurity categories to less severe categories. The primary
benefit from this framework is that there is no ambiguity in the transition from threshold
to threshold, with each cut point representing transition from less severe food insecurity to
more severe food insecurity. While not presented in the table, the coefficients on the first
stage residuals are strongly significant, with p-values <0.001, confirming the validity of the
control function approach.
Column (1) from table 5 presents the coefficients from the model. Here, we see that SNAP
reduced food hardship in U.S. households, however, the own effect of the ACA is positive,
small in magnitude, and statistically insignificant, suggesting relatively little impact from
the ACA alone. If individuals live in ACA expansion states, but do not meet the criteria
for subsidies, they will be required to pay some form of premium. This could result in
the positive, but small and insignificant own-effects in the first row. While magnitudes
are not directly interpretable from coefficients, we are able to see that not only did SNAP
reduce the probability a household experienced food hardship, but also that this reduction
in probability increased for families living in Medicaid expansion states. This suggests some
positive spillover from the ACA, with households participating in both programs experiencing
more gains than households treated by SNAP or the ACA alone.
Columns (2)-(4) show the marginal effects at each threshold of food security. These
marginal effects have the same implications as above. SNAP reduced the probability a
household was very low food secure by 15 percentage points, the probability a household was
low food secure by 16 percentage points, and the probability a household was marginally food
secure by 6.4 percentage points (all statistically significant at the 1% level). These results
also suggest that the impact of SNAP is strongest for those households experiencing more
severe food insecurity, but further suggest that SNAP alleviates all levels of food hardship,
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moving households towards full food security. However, households in each of these food
secure categories saw additional gains from the ACA. The marginal effects of the interaction
between the ACA and SNAP suggest that households participating in SNAP and in Medicaid
expansion states saw an additional reduction of 6.4 percentage points in the probability of
being very low food secure, an additional 6.8 percentage point reduction in the probability
of being low food secure, and an additional reduction in the probability of being marginally
food secure of 2.7 percentage points. All marginal effects for SNAP and the interaction of
the ACA and SNAP are statistically significant at the 1% level, and while the marginal
effects at the low food secure and very low food secure levels are not statistically different
from one another, both are statistically different from the marginal effect at the marginally
food secure level.
These results suggest large, increasing returns to program participation. Schmidt et al.
(2015) found that $1,000 in additional non-food benefits reduced the incidence of food inse-
curity by roughly 0.9 percentage points. While low food security and food insecurity measure
slightly different types of food hardship, a 6.5 percentage point reduction in the probability
of being low food secure is roughly equivalent to $6,500 in additional non-food benefits. The
average spending per enrollee in Medicaid was $5,7365 in 2014, suggesting that the Medicaid
expansions more than doubled the value of the benefit for SNAP recipients.
Table A1 in the appendix shows results from a standard ordered probit for reference.
The ordered probit results that do not control for reverse causality with SNAP show large,
negative values for the impact of the ACA, but also large positive values for the impact
of SNAP on food hardship. The two stage control function approach presented in table 5
removes the bias stemming from economic circumstances and participation in SNAP.
Table 6 presents the results of estimating equation (7) at different, nonmutually exclusive
food insecurity thresholds. For reference, I present results from OLS regressions that estimate
the impact of the ACA where the endogeneity of SNAP is not accounted for in table A2 in
5http://www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-spending-per-enrollee/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,
%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D
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the appendix, once again demonstrating the reverse causality associated with SNAP.
Column (1) shows the impact of the ACA on the commonly reported summary category
of food insecurity. Here, we see no statistical relationship between Medicaid expansion alone
and food insecurity. However, for households who also participate in SNAP, the ACA further
reduced the probability they are food insecure by 14.2 percentage points. In my sample,
53% of households participating in SNAP are food insecure. This 14.2 percentage point
reduction translates into a 26.8% decrease in the probability a household is food insecure.
Thus, program interaction matters, with increasing returns to program participation for
reductions in food insecurity.
Column (2) examines the effect of the ACA on marginal food insecurity. Here, we still see
the impact of multiple program participation as well as increasing returns to program par-
ticipation, with SNAP households seeing a reduction in the probability of being marginally
food insecure of 28 percentage points on a basis of 74%, or a 38% reduction in the probability
of being marginally food insecure.
This is strongly contrasted with results in column (3), where we see no impact of the ACA
on the probability of experiencing very low food security, regardless of SNAP participation.
However, we see the own effect from SNAP reduces the probability a household experiences
very low food security by 74 percentage points. The large coefficient suggests that SNAP
strongly reduces the probability individuals experience extreme food hardship, although
individuals who leave this category may still be food insecure. This suggests that at the
low end of the food security distribution, SNAP does most of the work in alleviating food
hardship, with little effect from healthcare programs. These results suggest that the ACA
and SNAP assist those at different ends of the food insecurity spectrum, and also present
the first IV estimates of SNAP on very low food security of which I am aware.
I also report first stage statistics to assess the performance of the instruments. The
Kleibergen under-identification statistics reject the null hypothesis that the SNAP access
measures and state policy variables are only weakly correlated with SNAP participation.
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Since I have more instruments than endogenous regressors, I also report the Hansen J statistic
as a test of overidentifying restrictions. Here, the large p-values result in failing to reject the
null hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term at any standard
threshold, giving greater confidence in the validity of the instrument set.
While the results in column (1) coincide with the notions of program interaction, some
of the results from columns (2) and (3), specifically the coefficients on SNAP, are surprising
in sign and magnitude. Taken at face value, the coefficient on SNAP in column (2) suggests
participating in SNAP increases the probability an individual is marginally food insecure by
33.2 percentage points, even when instrumenting for SNAP participation. In column (3), the
large, negative coefficient on SNAP suggests a surprisingly large decrease in very low food
insecurity. However, the findings in table 5 provide the needed context. Here, it seems that
SNAP reduces food hardship at all levels, but does not completely alleviate it, suggesting
SNAP increases the probability of being higher on the food security distribution (more food
secure), and decreases the probability of being lower on the food insecurity distribution (less
food secure).
The key finding of this paper is that the ACA reduces the probability a household expe-
riences food insecurity, but that these reductions are not uniform across the distribution of
food insecurity, nor are they uniform across the SNAP benefit population. Tables 5 and 6
together show the interplay of Medicaid expansion through the ACA and SNAP. The ACA
complemented the traditional food support system, further reducing food insecurity for those
already receiving SNAP benefits. Furthermore, I show that SNAP moves people up the food
security distribution at all levels.
Evidence on Mechanisms
Previously, I discussed the intuition behind how the ACA might influence food hardship.
In this section, I provide evidence detailing two mechanisms through which the ACA might
increase household access to food. In the background section, I presented budget constraint
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analysis that graphically depicts the income effect of receiving both Medicaid and SNAP
subsidies, with the general idea being that receiving subsidized public health care allows
households to reallocate resources away from medical expenditure and towards food expen-
diture. Thus, I directly estimate the effect of the ACA on food expenditure.
When estimating food expenditure models, I limit the analysis to the years 2011-2016.
The reason for this is twofold. First, as discussed previously, the wide discrepancy in the top-
coding of food expenditure in the CPS makes comparison with earlier years difficult. Second,
this provides a tighter window around Medicaid expansion to analyze expenditure. When
estimating food expenditure, I also further control for the income bin provided by the CPS.
While I do not have exact data on household income, attempting to estimate expenditure
without controlling for income in some fashion could bias estimates. Column (1) of table
7 shows instrumental variables results examining how both SNAP and the ACA influence
average real average weekly food expenditure using the same instrument set described above.
Here, we see that participation in SNAP increases weekly food expenditure by $164.32,
which I consider to be an upper bound on the effect of SNAP on food expenditure. From
2011-2016, the nominal value of the maximum weekly benefit for a family of four is approx-
imately $160, which is roughly equivalent to the estimate presented above. The average
family size for SNAP recipients in my sample is 3, with an average maximum weekly ben-
efit of $105.34. Average weekly food expenditure is $115.93. Thus, the estimated return
to SNAP participation is large compared with sample baselines. However, the instrumental
variables strategy results in a local average treatment effect, meaning the effect may be larger
than otherwise estimated. Beatty and Tuttle (2014) find that the actual food share of the
budget changes in response to changes in SNAP benefits, resulting in greater increases in
food expenditure than otherwise predicted, consistent with the results presented here.
Column (1) also shows that households in Medicaid expansion states see larger increases
than other households. I find that average weekly food expenditure is $21.63 lower in ACA
states on average, however, for households that reside in expansion states and participate in
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SNAP, food expenditure is $38.24 higher. This is once again consistent with requiring premi-
ums for those who do not meet Medicaid income cutoffs. These individuals may reduce food
expenditure to cover premiums (which will be required for all due to the individual mandate).
For those who also receive SNAP benefits, any income lost due to income will be mitigated
through food subsidies. The increase in food expenditure for SNAP recipients in Medicaid
expansion states is direct evidence for the mechanism described previously—households re-
siding in Medicaid expansion states see an additional return to program participation, once
again detailing the complementarities between Medicaid and SNAP. Thus, it seems that
subsidized public healthcare does act as an income shock for SNAP households, increasing
their access to food.
Another potential avenue for the ACA to influence food hardship comes through the
reduction in information and/or stigma costs associated with participating in the safety net.
Columns (2) and (3) of table 7 examine whether the Medicaid expansions through the ACA
brought new households into the safety net. For these households, participation in SNAP
(if they were not already participating) may become easier. Perhaps by participating in
public healthcare, these households have learned something about navigating the safety net,
making it subsequently easier to apply for, and obtain, SNAP benefits. These households
might also pay some fixed portion of the stigma costs, as noted by Keane and Moffitt (1998),
making it less costly for them to participate in SNAP. Columns (2) and (3) show that the
ACA increased SNAP take-up, regardless of using a linear probability or probit model to
estimate the impact on take-up. Together with the evidence from spending, I show two
means by which the ACA might cause the results presented above.
Additional Measures of Food Hardship
I now turn to other measures of food hardship. Table 8 presents IV results estimating the
impact of the ACA on the food insecurity gap, the square of the food insecurity gap, and the
income gap as defined in equations (11) and (12). OLS results are available in table A3 in the
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appendix. Here, I attempt to more fully utilize the entirety of the food security supplement
in the December CPS. Regardless of whether we consider only the food insecurity gap (dijt)
in column (1), or the square of the gap (d2ijt) in column (2), the results are the same. I find
that the own effect of the ACA is positive, suggesting that households in Medicaid expansion
states are more likely to be farther from the food security threshold. However, for households
participating in SNAP, the ACA reduces the distance to the food security threshold by 9.2-
10.1 percentage points. I also show that SNAP participation greatly reduces the distance to
the food security threshold by approximately 33-42 percentage points in both columns (1)
and (2). While less conclusive than the results from tables 5 and 6, these results still suggest
there are increasing returns to program participation, with the ACA and SNAP acting in
concert to reduce food hardship.
The income gap provides the benefit of directly monetizing the amount of food hardship
experienced by the household, at the expense of potential increases in measurement error.
The question as posed by the CPS asks individuals to opine on the amount of money that they
would require to meet food needs. The hypothetical nature of the question inherently poses
uncertainty in the measure. However, in column (3) I (imprecisely) estimate that the ACA
reduces the amount of money a household needs to meet food needs by approximately $5 per
week. I once again show increasing returns to program participation, with the magnitude of
the effect larger for households participating in SNAP. The coefficient on SNAP is positive.
Taken at face value, this suggests SNAP increases the amount of money a household needs
to meet food requirements; however, the coefficients on the ACA suggest beneficial effects
of Medicaid expansion.
These additional measures are less commonly reported in both the food insecurity lit-
erature and policy debates. However, they still suggest that the Medicaid expansions from
the ACA and SNAP work together to reduce food insecurity, and are more effective as a
pair than either alone. While precise identification of these parameters is difficult, they
compliment earlier, more ubiquitous measures of food insecurity.
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V. Conclusion
The focus of the Affordable Care Act was to overhaul the American healthcare system
through mandated coverage, subsidized private coverage, reforms in Medicare taxes and
spending, and significant expansions in the Medicaid program to low income populations.
Gruber (2011) provides an overview of the aims and predicted consequences of the ACA,
documenting many of the challenges associated with assessing the impact of the law. How-
ever, he does not consider the impact that expanded Medicaid coverage might have on food
insecurity, one of the largest public health concerns facing the nation.
Participating in multiple safety net programs is one way households may increase total
resources available to alleviate food hardship. This paper examines the effect of the Afford-
able Care Act, one of the largest increases in Medicaid coverage, on food insecurity. While
the primary goal of Medicaid expansion through the ACA was to increase healthcare cover-
age across America, I find strong evidence that the ACA also reduced food hardship across
the spectrum of food security, but that these gains were concentrated among those who also
participated in SNAP. I find the ACA reduced the probability a household participating in
SNAP falls into the two lowest food security categories by about 6.5 percentage points, and
reduced the probability these households were classified as food insecure by 14.2 percentage
points.
One consistent implication of the results implies that the ACA had a differential impact
depending on whether the household received SNAP benefits. Despite the reverse causality
between SNAP and food security, demonstrated in this work and elsewhere, I show that
households that both reside in Medicaid expansion states and receive SNAP benefits expe-
rience larger gains in food security than households benefiting from either program alone.
Households in Medicaid expansion states see a 45% greater reduction in the probability of
being very low food secure or low food secure than households participating in SNAP alone.
Households that participate in SNAP and live in Medicaid expansion states see a decrease
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in the probability of being food insecure, nearly doubling the impact from SNAP alone.
Even under alternative measures of food hardship, I consistently find evidence for increasing
returns to food security from program participation; living in a Medicaid expansion state
and participating in SNAP have larger benefits for food security than either program alone.
Increasing returns to program participation shows that by analyzing these programs sepa-
rately, we risk mischaracterizing the benefits of the safety net. Rarely do families participate
in only one safety net program. By receiving multiple types of benefits, households may be
able to redirect resources in ways that compound gains in resources from a single program.
As this study shows, by including multiple benefit types in our analyses, we may be able to
get a more complete picture of where policy actually bites. This is especially relevant for
researchers studying the impact of the safety net on poverty related issues. By limiting the
scope of analysis for safety net issues, researchers narrow the spectrum of results that might
otherwise be present. Ultimately, this paper shows that public health insurance has benefits
beyond healthcare coverage. While access to quality medical care is crucial for the health of
all families, so too is access to food. As many studies have shown, food insecurity can have
large, detrimental effects on health. I show that public healthcare can make large strides in
alleviating health risks posed by food insecurity.
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Figure 8: Household Food Security
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Figure 9: Household Food Security by Medicaid Expansion
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Figure 10: Mean of FI Gap
Figure 11: Mean of Income Gap
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Table 1: Food Insecurity Questions
1 “We worried whether our food would run out before we got money to buy more.” Was that
often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?
2 “The food that we bought just didn’t last and we didn’t have money to get more.” Was
that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?
3 “We couldn’t afford to eat balanced meals.” Was that often, sometimes, or never true for
you in the last 12 months?
4 In the last 12 months, did you or other adults in the household ever cut the size of your
meals or skip meals because there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)
5 (If yes to question 4) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but
not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months?
6 In the last 12 months, did you ever eat less than you felt you should because there wasn’t
enough money for food? (Yes/No)
7 In the last 12 months, were you ever hungry, but didn’t eat, because there wasn’t enough
money for food? (Yes/No)
8 In the last 12 months, did you lose weight because there wasn’t enough money for food?
(Yes/No)
9 In the last 12 months did you or other adults in your household ever not eat for a whole
day because there wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)
10 (If yes to question 9) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but
not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months?
Questions 11-18 were asked only if the household included children age 0-17
11 “We relied on only a few kinds of low-cost food to feed our children because we were running
out of money to buy food.” Was that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12
months?
12 “We couldn’t feed our children a balanced meal, because we couldn’t afford that.” Was
that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?
13 “The children were not eating enough because we just couldn’t afford enough food.” Was
that often, sometimes, or never true for you in the last 12 months?
14 In the last 12 months, did you ever cut the size of any of the children’s meals because there
wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)
15 In the last 12 months, were the children ever hungry but you just couldn’t afford more food?
(Yes/No)
16 In the last 12 months, did any of the children ever skip a meal because there wasn’t enough
money for food? (Yes/No)
17 (If yes to question 16) How often did this happen—almost every month, some months but
not every month, or in only 1 or 2 months?
18 In the last 12 months did any of the children ever not eat for a whole day because there
wasn’t enough money for food? (Yes/No)
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Table 2: Summary Statistics by Medicaid Expansion and SNAP Receipt
ACA No ACA
SNAP No SNAP SNAP No SNAP
<130% Pov. Line 0.75 0.13 0.76 0.15
<185% Pov. Line 0.85 0.22 0.87 0.26
<200% Pov. Line 0.88 0.24 0.90 0.28
WIC 0.29 0.08 0.27 0.08
Free Lunch 0.82 0.36 0.83 0.36
Free Break. 0.81 0.69 0.87 0.77
Age 44.15 50.44 43.99 49.95
High School 0.36 0.28 0.36 0.29
Some College 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.29
College 0.06 0.34 0.05 0.30
Hisp 0.21 0.11 0.19 0.11
White 0.67 0.83 0.61 0.82
Black 0.26 0.10 0.35 0.14
Unemp. 6.86 6.55 6.43 6.05
ln(50/10) 1.63 1.65 1.53 1.54
25th pctile 17010.58 17153.87 16145.02 16252.44
Emp./Pop. 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.46
Num. in HH 3.04 2.48 3.07 2.43
Num. Child 1.06 0.52 1.05 0.50
Female 0.68 0.48 0.69 0.47
Married 0.26 0.53 0.27 0.54
Metro 0.82 0.87 0.74 0.80
Obs. 34,057 422,632 21,365 231,340
Note: Household survey weights used.
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Table 3: IV Summary by Medicaid Expansion
Medicaid Expansion Non-Expansion
Broad Based Categorical Eligibility 0.56 0.50(0.49) (0.49)
Excl. All Vehicles 0.72 0.57(0.43) (0.49)
Higher Vehicle Exemption 0.03 0.29(0.15) (0.45)
Requires Fingerprinting 0.23 0.13(0.42) (0.33)
Child Non-Cit. Elig 0.89 0.86(0.30) (0.33)
Adult Non-Cit. Elig 0.27 0.06(0.44) (0.23)
Online Application 0.57 0.55(0.48) (0.48)
Digital Signiture 0.41 0.49(0.48) (0.49)
Max SNAP Benefit 3.60 3.56(1.55) (1.50)
ln(Min. Wage) 1.95 1.87(0.12) (0.09)
Note: Household survey weights used.
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Table 4: First Stage Results, Food Rank Second Stage Dependent Variable
SNAP
(1)
ACA × SNAP
(2)
Broad Based Categorical Eligibility 0.008 −0.004∗∗(0.006) (0.002)
Excl. All Vehicles 0.002 −0.001(0.006) (0.002)
Higher Vehicle Exemption −0.002 0.001(0.012) (0.002)
Requires Fingerprinting −0.003 0.009(0.008) (0.006)
Child Non-Cit. Elig 0.012 −0.003(0.012) (0.002)
Adult Non-Cit. Elig −0.002 0.001(0.014) (0.002)
Online Application −0.001 −0.003∗(0.006) (0.002)
Digital Signiture 0.007 0.001(0.007) (0.002)
Max SNAP Benefit 0.017∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗(0.003) (0.000)
ln(Min. Wage) −0.032 −0.008(0.027) (0.011)
ACA × BBCE −0.004 0.042∗(0.010) (0.021)
ACA × Excl. All Vehicles 0.003 −0.016(0.014) (0.021)
ACA × Fingerprint 0.004 −0.053∗∗∗(0.013) (0.012)
ACA × Online App. 0.024 −0.083(0.048) (0.068)
ACA × Adult Non-Cit. Elig 0.051∗∗ −0.084∗∗(0.021) (0.033)
ACA × Digital Sig. 0.005 0.024(0.016) (0.019)
ACA × Max SNAP Benefit −0.026∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗(0.002) (0.005)
ACA × ln(Min. Wage) −0.039 0.212∗∗∗(0.052) (0.066)
F Stat. 75.4488 3,145.5295(0.0000) (0.0000)
Obs. 290,707 290,707
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Household
survey weights used. Controls include gender, household size, number of children, marital status,
age, age squared, disability status, race, education, urban/rural status, number of medicaid
beneficiaries in the state, governor party affiliation, the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile
of income, and the unemployment rate. F statistic p-value in parentheses.
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Table 5: Ordered Probit Coefficients and Marginal Effects: Two-Stage
Coeffs.
(1)
Marginal FS
(2)
Low FS
(3)
Very Low FS
(4)
ACA 0.082 0.006 0.014 0.013(0.051) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008)
SNAP −0.940∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.160∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗(0.230) (0.016) (0.039) (0.037)
ACA × SNAP −0.481∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗(0.165) (0.011) (0.028) (0.026)
Obs. 284,804 284,804 284,804 284,804
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Ordering
for probit is 0—fully food secure, 1—marginal food security, 2—low food security, 3—very low
food security. Household survey weights used. Controls include gender, household size, number
of children, marital status, age, age squared, disability status, race, education, urban/rural
status, number of medicaid beneficiaries in the state, governor party affiliation, the 50/10 income
ratio, the 25th percentile of income, and the unemployment rate
Table 6: Triple Difference LPM: IV
Food Insecure
(1)
Marginal FI
(2)
Very Low FI
(3)
ACA 0.030 −0.015 0.058(0.038) (0.035) (0.038)
SNAP −0.184∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ −0.743∗∗∗(0.055) (0.081) (0.079)
ACA × SNAP −0.172∗∗ −0.265∗∗∗ −0.044(0.086) (0.088) (0.103)
Under ID Kleibergen 27.4528 27.4528 27.4528(0.0518) (0.0518) (0.0518)
Hansen J 20.9529 23.7661 14.8943(0.1803) (0.0947) (0.5324)
Obs. 284,804 284,804 284,804
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. P-
values in parentheses for first stage statistics. Household survey weights used. Controls include
gender, household size, number of children, marital status, age, age squared, disability status,
race, education, urban/rural status, number of medicaid beneficiaries in the state, governor
party affiliation, the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile of income, and the unemployment
rate
50
Table 7: ACA Mechanisms
Avg. Weekly Spending
(1)
SNAP Take-Up LPM
(2)
SNAP Take-Up Probit
(3)
ACA −21.628∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗(10.144) (0.009) (0.033)
SNAP 164.315∗∗∗(26.972)
ACA × SNAP 59.863∗(31.171)
Obs. 96,522 290,707 290,707
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Household
survey weights used. Controls include gender, household size, number of children, marital status,
age, age squared, disability status, race, education, urban/rural status, number of medicaid
beneficiaries in the state, governor party affiliation, family income (spending), the 50/10 income
ration, the 25th percentile of income, and the unemployment rate. Years for spending 2011-2016.
Table 8: Alternative Measures of Food Hardship
FI Gap
(1)
FI Gap Squared
(2)
Inc. Gap
(3)
ACA 0.069∗∗ 0.072∗∗∗ 0.181(0.030) (0.027) (1.596)
SNAP −0.423∗∗∗ −0.327∗∗∗ 16.683∗∗(0.060) (0.052) (7.995)
ACA × SNAP −0.161∗∗ −0.173∗∗ −6.921(0.079) (0.074) (5.005)
Under ID Kleibergen 28.0890 28.0890 27.7125(0.0439) (0.0439) (0.0484)
Hansen J 17.8778 17.3594 13.6181(0.3311) (0.3627) (0.6271)
Obs. 194,565 194,565 264,521
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. P-
values in parentheses for first stage statistics. Household survey weights used. Controls include
gender, household size, number of children, marital status, age, age squared, disability status,
race, education, urban/rural status, number of medicaid beneficiaries in the state, governor
party affiliation, the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile of income, and the unemployment
rate
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Appendix A.-Additional Tables and Figures
Figure 12
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Table A1: Ordered Probit Coefficients and Marginal Effects
Coeffs.
(1)
Marginal FS
(2)
Low FS
(3)
Very Low FS
(4)
ACA −0.221∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗(0.033) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005)
SNAP 0.609∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗(0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
ACA × SNAP 0.136∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗(0.030) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Obs. 284,804 284,804 284,804 284,804
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Ordering
for probit is 0—fully food secure, 1—marginal food security, 2—low food security, 3—very low
food security. Household survey weights used. Controls include gender, household size, number
of children, marital status, age, age squared, disability status, race, education, urban/rural
status, number of medicaid beneficiaries in the state, governor party affiliation, the 50/10 income
ratio, the 25th percentile of income, and the unemployment rate
Table A2: Triple Differece: LPM
Food Insecure
(1)
Marginal FI
(2)
Very Low FI
(3)
ACA −0.064∗∗∗ −0.108∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗(0.008) (0.011) (0.005)
SNAP 0.219∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
ACA × SNAP 0.039∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.013(0.010) (0.011) (0.008)
Obs. 284,804 284,804 284,804
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Household
survey weights used. Controls include gender, household size, number of children, marital status,
age, age squared, disability status, race, education, urban/rural status, number of medicaid
beneficiaries in the state, governor party affiliation, the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile
of income, and the unemployment rate
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Table A3: Alternative Measures of Food Hardship: LPM
FI Gap
(1)
FI Gap Squared
(2)
Inc. Gap
(3)
ACA −0.018∗∗∗ −0.002 −1.535∗∗∗(0.006) (0.004) (0.375)
SNAP 0.111∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ 8.823∗∗∗(0.004) (0.003) (0.269)
ACA × SNAP −0.009 −0.032∗∗∗ 0.697(0.006) (0.005) (0.701)
Obs. 194,565 194,565 264,521
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Household
survey weights used. Controls include gender, household size, number of children, marital status,
age, age squared, disability status, race, education, urban/rural status, number of medicaid
beneficiaries in the state, governor party affiliation, the 50/10 income ratio, the 25th percentile
of income, and the unemployment rate
Table A4: Real Average Weekly Food Expenditure 2011-2016: OLS
OLS Avg. Weekly
Spending
ACA −1.468(1.031)
SNAP −0.778(0.969)
ACA × SNAP −0.737(1.533)
Obs. 96,522
Note: standard errors clustered at the state level, * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01. Household
survey weights used. Controls include gender, household size, number of children, marital status,
age, age squared, disability status, race, education, urban/rural status, number of medicaid
beneficiaries in the state, governor party affiliation, family income, the 50/10 income ration, the
25th percentile of income, and the unemployment rate.
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